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Abstract 
Over the last two decades and across a number of jurisdictions, new measures enshrined in 
criminal law and administrative codes have empowered authorities to exclude unwelcome 
groups and individuals from public spaces. Focusing particular attention on recent reform in 
Britain, this paper traces the evolution of contemporary exclusionary practices, from their 
initial concern with proscribed behaviour to the penalisation of mere presence. The latter 
part of the paper offers a critical assessment of what has driven these innovations in control 
of the public realm. Here consideration is given to two possibilities. First, that such policy is 
the outcome of punitive and revanchist logics. Second, that their intentions are essentially 
benign, reflecting concerns about risk, liveability and failures of traditional order 
maintenance mechanisms. While acknowledging concerns about the over-eagerness of 
scholars to brand new policy as punitive, the paper concludes that any benign intentions are 
overshadowed by the regressive and marginalising consequences of preferred solutions. 
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Introduction: the penalisation of presence  
 
“The late modern world celebrates diversity and difference, which it readily absorbs and sanitizes; what 
it cannot abide is difficult people and dangerous classes, which it seeks to build elaborate defences 
against” [emphasis in the original] (Young 1999, 59) 
 
Across many western jurisdictions, reforms to the criminal law and administrative codes 
since the 1990s have increasingly made public space a site from which those whose 
presence is unwelcome or considered inappropriate find themselves barred. In particular, it 
is those who Tyler describes as ‘abject’ and Young (1999) as ‘difficult’ – the homeless, 
convicted sex, drug and public order offenders and marginalised youth – who find their 
rights within the public realm constrained by innovative mechanisms of ‘preventive justice’ 
(Ashworth and Zedner 2014) underpinned by criminal sanctions. These ‘usual suspects’ 
come into conflict with desirable norms governing contemporary urban space due to their 
behaviour, appearance, visibility or expropriation of the public realm for activities more 
usually associated with private space (Beckett and Herbert 2010; MacLeod 2002; Stevens 
2009; Walby and Lippert 2012). Not only are these disorderly bodies considered to generate 
fear and unease amongst other users of these spaces (Tyler 2013; Wilson and Kelling 1982) 
but, as gentrification and urban regeneration have swept post-industrial towns and cities, so 
the eradication of signs and symbols of disorder, both physical and human, has become 
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viewed as central to the successful rehabilitation of urban economies and up-and-coming 
neighbourhoods (MacLeod and Johnstone 2012; Smith 1996; Slater 2006).The desire of 
corporate interests to produce unchallenging and well-managed environments for the 
middle class market – the ‘Starbucking’ (Zukin 2010) or `domestication by cappuccino’ 
(Atkinson 2003) of urban space – has been an additional driving force but, most notably in 
the UK, so have concerns about the liveability and sustainability of deprived residential 
neighbourhoods (Hancock and Mooney 2013; Johnstone and MacLeod 2007; Squires 2006), 
where the behaviour and expropriation of communal public space by some is considered to 
exclude fearful others (Donoghue 2010).  
 
The principal concern of the paper is to interrogate the penalisation of presence: the 
deployment of legally-mandated ordinances and other techniques which make the mere 
presence of certain undesirable groups or individuals in defined spaces an offence, 
rendering them legitimate targets for interdiction. Developments in England and Wales 
since the 1990s are afforded particular attention. Here, concern about the problem of 
broadly defined ‘anti-social behaviour’ has led to the creation of a number of hotly debated 
‘coercive prevention’ measures (Ashworth and Zedner, 2014) designed to suppress it. The 
practice of developing new mechanisms for excluding the ‘difficult’ from public space is, 
however, evident in a number of western democracies and the paper’s first objective is to 
explore this wider context. The second objective is to critically examine developments in 
Britain and, in particular, legislation passed by the UK Parliament in 2014 which has 
extensively reformed powers of control and exclusion. The likely implications of these 
reforms are considered. The final objective is to debate how we might best account for the 
penalisation of presence: should we view it as part of a more general turn towards 
punitiveness in the management of social problems under neo-liberalism – a perspective 
which is both seductive and contested – or a pragmatic and essentially benign, if flawed, 
attempt to resolve demands for safer and more liveable urban spaces? 
 
The genesis of contemporary exclusion: Annihilating space for the usual suspects 
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The importance of exclusion as a technique for managing urban space was brought into 
focus in the 1990s by Don Mitchell’s (1996; 1997) research on the anti-homeless legislation 
which had been implemented in U.S. cities during the preceding decade. The homeless and 
other ‘out of place’ social groups, Mitchell posits, are considered problematic because they 
expropriate urban public space for everyday activities that the majority of citizens are able 
to carry out in private space. In so doing, they pose a challenge to the aesthetic of urban 
public space that city managers wish to create in order to make downtown areas appealing 
for investors and consumers – an argument reinforced by Walby and Lippert’s (2012) 
research on anti-homeless interventions in the vicinity of public buildings and tourist sites in 
Ottawa, Canada. Rather than penalise vagrancy by resurrecting old laws, Mitchell found that 
municipal authorities instead targeted the activities that those denied access to private 
space undertake in public, outlawing acts including sleeping and sitting on streets, urinating 
in public, street drinking  and begging within certain designated zones (Mitchell 1997; 
Doherty et al 2008). Municipal authorities also sought to make city centre public spaces less 
liveable for the homeless by closing down or charging a fee to access public toilets and by 
removing benches on which they might sleep. Another tactic has been to privatise or 
otherwise restrict access to certain spaces usually open to the public. Doherty et al (2008) 
discuss how transport hubs in a number of European cities, which had long been places 
where the homeless would seek shelter, were either being shut overnight, had become 
accessible only to those with a valid ticket for travel or were being transferred to the 
management of private corporations who could then legitimately deploy security guards to 
restrict access to their premises.  
 
Research by the National Law Centre on Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP) (2014) 
documents how U.S. cities have further tightened and extended anti-homeless laws. In 
particular, it identified a surge in the number of cities imposing bans on camping in public. 
These bans were city-wide in 34% of cities (p18). Such laws are especially significant as they 
are often written so as to encompass all forms of temporary shelter a homeless person 
might utilise, from a tent to a car, and in some cases also prohibit sleeping outdoors without 
shelter. As the NLCHP (2014: 18) observes: 
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By leaving no single place where homeless people can lawfully camp, these bans transform entire 
communities into “no homeless zones” where homeless people are left with the choice of facing 
constant threat of arrest or leaving town.    
 
In Los Angeles, a city with a homeless population estimated at over 28,000 (LAHSA, 2016), 
controversial policy proposals by the city administration (see Blasi and Mangano 2015) 
sought to empowered the police and sanitation department to confiscate and destroy 
possessions  – and by extension their shanty-like encampments – which the homeless 
stored in public space.   
 
Mitchell (1997) argues that restrictions over the usage of public space imposed by this type 
of carefully crafted legislation equates to the `annihilation of space by law` for the 
homeless, since activities which they have little choice but to undertake in public are 
proscribed, thereby making it impossible for them to be in these spaces. Mitchell went so 
far as to suggest that in annihilating space for the homeless, homelessness was being 
annihilated as a viable practice in some downtown areas. Significantly, the U.S. Department 
of Justice (DoJ) echoed this argument in 2015 when, using its powers to intervene in civil 
rights matters, it submitted a Statement of Interest to a district court hearing on an anti-
camping ordinance. The DoJ (2015) argued that a shortage of shelter accommodation for 
the homeless in the city of Boise meant sleeping outdoors was the only option available to 
them – a function of their status as people with no abode rather than a conduct issue – 
making it impossible for many homeless to avoid breaching the criminal law. As the 
Statement of Interest makes clear: “If a person literally has nowhere else to go, then 
enforcement of the anti-camping ordinance against that person criminalizes her for being 
homeless” (DoJ 2015: 12).  
 
The exclusionary practices examined so far have been those targeted at particular types of 
observable behaviour. Intervention in these cases is a response to witnessed activity in a 
given location and public spaces are not (officially at least) off limits to anyone as long as 
they refrain from proscribed behaviour. However, a newer set of measures has seen the 
scope of exclusion widened, both in terms of who is targeted and the geographical zones 
from which they can be excluded.  
 
Later version published in International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 
6(2), 2017. Available open access at: https://www.crimejusticejournal.com/article/view/299   
 
5 
 
Zoning out the problematic 
 
A typical characterisation of public space is that which is open to all citizens: “so long as 
their behaviour does not violate specified conduct regulations (principally set forth in 
criminal law), they are at liberty to proceed as they please” (von Hirsch and Shearing 2000, 
79). In a number of jurisdictions, however, traditional rules governing the use of public 
space have been inverted: for certain segments of the population designated urban zones 
have become off limits altogether, meaning their mere presence in these spaces, regardless 
of behaviour, is unlawful and can trigger removal and criminal penalty (see Beckett and 
Herbert 2008). Typically, although not in all cases, a civil or administrative order or 
admonishment, which bans the recipient from specific geographic zones for a set period, is 
triggered by prior conduct.   
 
Drawing on their research on Seattle, one amongst a number of US cities to have adopted 
zoning provisions, Beckett and Herbert (2008; 2009; 2010; Herbert and Beckett 2009), 
explore how new exclusionary practices have led to ‘banishment’ for those on the margins 
of society. Large areas of Seattle have been zoned as Stay Out of Areas of Prostitution 
(SOAPs) and Stay Out of Drugs Areas (SODAs), the latter designation covering the whole 
downtown area. Those convicted of, or sometimes just arrested for, a wide set of offence 
are required to avoid these zones. Failure to abide by these limits on geographical presence 
is a criminal offence that can result in the enhancing of criminal penalties which recipients 
may already be serving. Police officers are also permitted to issue Trespass Admonishments 
to anyone “without legitimate purpose” to be on publicly owned facilities such as housing 
complexes, public transport termini and college campuses. Furthermore, the right to tackle 
trespass on private property can be transferred to the police, placing many other privately 
owned but publicly accessible spaces, such as parking lots, under the aegis of these new 
controls. An admonishment usually bans the recipient from a defined space or cluster of 
spaces, for example all parking lots in the downtown area, for a year with breach treated as 
criminal trespass (Beckett and Herbert 2010: 7). Another civil order which can lead to 
criminal conviction if breached is the Parks Exclusion Order. It can be issued to anyone in 
violation of park rules governing, for example, drinking alcohol, being in a park outside 
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opening hours, and public urination, and “[t]he Seattle ordinance authorizes police and park 
officials to exclude an alleged rule violator without providing any evidence of wrong-doing” 
(Beckett and Herbert 2010: 8). Exclusion can be for a year and from all of the city’s parks.  
 
The banishment of undesirables from certain urban zones is not restricted to the USA. 
Belina (2007) documents the introduction of area bans [Aufenthaltsverbote] into the police 
law of Germany’s regions, giving the authorities considerable powers to ban, from a 
designated zone, anyone reasonably assumed to be likely to commit a crime. His research in 
Bremen explores the use of this power to curb the open-air drug scene in the city’s principal 
leisure district, highlighting the way in which the discourse surrounding such bans “links the 
mere presence of undesirables to ‘crime’, making their eviction a task for the police” (Belina 
2007, 324). In contrast, it is disorder associated with alcohol that has led to the 
development of ‘zonal controls’ in Australia. Like Beckett and Herbert, Palmer and Warren 
(2014) draw attention to the use of administrative or ‘police’ laws to exclude problem 
populations without the need to go through lengthy prosecution processes associated with 
traditional criminal sanctions. In Victoria, they note the use of such ordinances “to restrict 
the mere presence of people in designated areas where alcohol can be purchased and 
consumed” (2014: 432). Here zones are demarcated once agreed upon by senior police and 
liquor licensing officials on the grounds that they are areas prone to alcohol-related disorder 
and violence. Exclusion from designated zones takes two forms: a short term ban (maximum 
72 hours) imposed by the police on someone whose track record of minor offences marks 
them as a high risk of recidivism, or a court-imposed ban of up to 12 months on someone 
who has committed a specified offence within the defined zone. Breach attracts criminal 
penalties.   
 
As the discussion so far has shown, measures enabling the penalisation of presence in public 
space have been developed in a number of jurisdictions under a variety of guises. Each 
contribution to this uneven patchwork has typically originated locally, driven by a city or 
regional government eager to better-manage potential sources of disorder in its territory. 
Britain is unusual, therefore, in that civil ordinances, zoning and other dispersal mechanisms 
have been written into law by central governmenti, meaning that their use is geographically 
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widespread. In large part the British conjuncture is a consequence of the prominence 
afforded the perceived problem of anti-social behaviour (ASB) by Tony Blair and his New 
Labour government in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Johnstone 2016 for a summary). 
During this period a climate developed which was extremely hostile to ASB – rowdy, 
uncivilised conduct and low level criminality, such as graffiti and vandalism – and those 
thought to perpetrate it (Squires 2006), spurring the introduction of uncompromising 
control measures. The official definition of ASB as “Acting in a manner that caused or was 
likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not at the same 
household as himself” (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s.1.1a) provided scope for intervention 
in a wide spectrum of behaviour. The mechanisms put in place to combat ASB have, 
moreover, significantly empowered the police and local government to exclude from public 
space those engaged in behaviour deemed unwelcome. It is to the British experience we 
now turn. 
 
Controlling the anti-social in England and Wales: continuity and change 
 
The Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 swept away many of the ordinances 
directed at ASB in England and Wales which had accumulated since 1998 and replaced them 
with new powers and mechanisms of control (Johnstone 2016)ii. Some of these were 
adaptations of previous provision, others innovations that provided government bodies and 
local communities with powers they had not previously enjoyed. Under the New Labour 
governments, the first generation of ASB controls targeted both problematic behaviour and 
spaces considered to be prone to anti-social activity. While the ‘usual suspects’ targeted in 
other jurisdictions were frequently caught up in the web of constraints directed at ASB 
(NAPO 2005), a crucial difference was that young people quickly became a privileged target 
(Bannister and Kearns 2012; Squires and Stephen 2005; Waiton 2005). This was especially so 
in those acutely disadvantaged neighbourhoods where young people disengaged from 
education and drifted into ‘street corner society’ (MacDonald et al 2010). Visibility coupled 
with political rhetoric reconstructing nuisance behaviour as anti-social and, therefore, in 
need of interdiction ensured that young people found their activities within the public realm 
under close scrutiny (Squires 2006; Pickering et al 2012; Tyler 2013)iii. 
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Two ASB control measures introduced by the Blair governments, which live on in revised 
form post 2014, had notable implications for access to and use of public space. Recipients of 
the flagship Anti-Social Behaviour Order (Asbo), imposed by the courts, were required to 
desist from specified behaviour or face criminal sanction. In this regard, it was functionally 
similar to the US anti-homeless legislation documented by Mitchell (1997) in that 
participation in banned behaviour or activities needed to be witnessed before enforcement 
action was triggered. However, an Asbo could also ban its recipient from entering 
designated spaces, ranging from a specific property to a whole neighbourhood, making 
mere presence in the proscribed location(s) a breach of the Order. There is a distinct parallel 
here with the way in which the ordinances discussed by Beckett and Herbert (2009) and 
Palmer and Warren (2014) operate. The designation of zones from which problem 
populations could be excluded was, however, a feature of another first generation ASB 
control mechanism. The Dispersal Order permitted defined areas, where senior police and 
local government officers concurred that ASB was a recurrent problem, to be designated as 
Dispersal Zones for a six month period. Such zones might encompass a few streets or extend 
across whole neighbourhoods. The police could require groups of two or more people to 
leave these zones and not return within 24 hours if their presence or behaviour had resulted 
in or was “likely to result in any member of the public being intimidated, harassed, alarmed 
or distress” (Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003: s.30). Failure to comply was a criminal offence. 
Those aged under 16 found in these zones at night could be returned home.  
 
The most recent developments in ASB control in England and Wales have placed a renewed 
focus on problematic presence. The 2010-15 Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government, although relatively silent on the problems of crime and disorder for much of its 
period in office, made reforming the ASB control mechanisms bequeathed it by previous 
Labour administrations one of its goals. Rationalising and tidying up the patchwork of 
statutory measures created by earlier legislation was one of its objectives but so was making 
the powers available more responsive to need and better able to tackle behavioural 
challenges to liveability and quality of life (Home Office 2012). Of the many provisions 
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included in the 2014 Act, there are three that appear most consequential for usage of public 
space: the Injunction, the dispersal power, and the Public Spaces Protection Order.  
 
The Injunction is essentially a revised form of the Asbo and, like its predecessor, requires a 
recipient to abide by specified conditions, which can include not entering certain spaces. As 
a wholly civil remedy, applications are assessed against the civil burden of proof (‘on the 
balance of probability’) and breach is no longer a criminal offence but contempt of court, 
attracting less severe penalties than failure to abide by the conditions of an Asbo. The 
maximum duration of an Injunction is 12 months for under 18s and must be specified for 
adults but there is no minimum or maximum prescribed by the legislation. 
 
The new dispersal power draws heavily on the old Dispersal Order, maintaining the same 
criminal penalty and similar triggers for dispersal, but considerably extends its reach. Its 
deployment is now entirely at the discretion of the police and the officer involved in 
designation in any given locale is of a more junior rank than before. Crucially, the power to 
disperse has become more geographically mobile, no longer constrained within fixed and 
publicised Dispersal Zones. Pre-designation of the areas in which use of dispersal powers is 
permitted is still required but this is now temporary (for a maximum of 48 hours) and a 
police Inspector can make the designation as and when one is considered appropriate. The 
power to disperse within a designated area rests with all police and police community 
support officers. It is no longer expressly a measure to tackle group ASB and can be 
deployed against anyone in the designated area on the grounds of their witnessed or 
potential for ASB. Anyone directed to disperse can now be required to stay out of the 
temporarily-designated area for up to 48 hours. The dispersing officer can also require the 
surrender of any possessions considered to have been, or which may be, used in the 
commission of ASB. Failure to comply is a criminal offence. 
 
The zonal component of the Dispersal Order – and the participation of municipal authorities 
in identification and designation of these zones – lives on in the new Public Spaces 
Protection Order (PSPO), although this is where any similarity ends. Parallels have, instead, 
been drawn between the PSPO and the Asbo (Garrett, 2015) because the new order allows 
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locally-specified non-criminal activities to be banned from designated spaces with failure to 
comply attracting punishment, in this case a fixed penalty fine. Non-payment of the fine 
becomes a criminal offence. Rather than being imposed on an individual, municipal 
authorities subject geographic areas to PSPOs. Their locally-defined prohibitions apply to all 
users of the designated space or a sub-population, such as teenagers. Crucially, the 
threshold for imposing a PSPO – activity with ‘a detrimental effect on the quality of life of 
those in the locality’ (ASBCPA 2014: s.59.2) – is much lower than for new byelaws 
(Manifesto Club 2014). Moreover, it is not necessary for the activities attracting the PSPO to 
be shown to be impacting negatively on a locality since an Order can be future orientated, 
imposed on activities which are likely to be detrimental and likely to be persistent or 
continuing. A PSPO lasts for up to three years but can be renewed before it expires for a 
further three years. There are no limits on the repetition of the renewal process.  
 
The switch from Asbo to Injunction appears likely to have relatively little impact on the 
public space context, although it is unclear whether authorities will be more or less eager to 
seek Injunctions than they were Asbos or if decisions may be influenced by the availability of 
other new powers. By contrast, the enhancing of dispersal powers would seem much more 
significant. In removing the focus on group ASB and handing designation of areas where the 
power of dispersal can be exercised to a middle ranking police officer, the legislation has 
sharply increased the potential for the removal of the unwanted from urban space. Indeed, 
the Manifesto Club (2014) has raised concern about the dispersal power being used to 
criminalise “being in public space”. In vesting the dispersal power solely in the police, the 
2014 legislation has also removed a formal opportunity for local agencies to discuss the 
problem of ASB – and what the most appropriate long-term remedy might be – in a given 
locality. The PSPO has attracted even greater criticism, especially since local authorities have 
started to set out where and against what they will be deployed. Since its inception, civil 
liberty pressure groups (Manifesto Club 2014; Liberty 2015) have argued that the PSPO is 
too vaguely defined in the 2014 Act, giving local government too much power to outlaw 
activities and, by extension, those groups that engage in them, from large areas of towns 
and cities. They also point out that the grounds for appeal against the imposition of an 
Order are extremely narrow and the fixed penalty notices for a breach can be issued by 
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anyone authorised by the local authority making the Order, such as private security 
contractors. Liberty (2015) has already expressed concern about the PSPOs in place or under 
development, some of which involve blanket bans across large geographic areas on 
activities typically associated with the homeless or young people. Begging, street drinking, 
sitting on the ground, camping, storing possessions, the congregation of youths in groups (of 
three or more) and skateboarding have all been identified by various local authorities as 
threats to quality of life which need banned (Liberty 2015; Manifesto Club 2014).    
 
Reading exclusion: punishing the precarious? 
 
The mobilization of criminal law to address “disorder” is... part of a larger rendering of certain 
individuals as outside the bounds of respectability, as unwanted miscreants in need of expulsion 
(Herbert and Beckett 2009, 4) 
 
There is a certain logic in reading the penalisation of presence as yet another punitive policy 
response: one designed to sooth the anxieties of an intolerant public and reassure investors 
by corralling those who may make urban life challenging. The penalisation of poverty 
(Wacquant 2009), the criminalisation of social policy (Rodger 2008) and the criminalisation 
of immigration (Aliverti 2014) have each served to extend the ability of criminal justice 
systems to enmesh and cloister away ‘deviant bodies’ (Alexander 2010; Hallsworth and Lea 
2011). The array of measures discussed in this article is seemingly of a piece, attesting to a 
willingness to resolve perceived social problems in ways that often tend to deepen the 
marginalisation of those already socially excluded, be it through criminalisation or 
restrictions on their movement through urban space. Those caught up in the new web of 
controls are punished by exclusion for what they have done in the past or for what they 
might do in the future. Crucially, some commentators argue, “a criminology of the alien 
other” (Garland 1996), which separates, demonises and abjectifies perceived miscreant 
groups (Young 1999; Wacquant 2009; Tyler 2013) legitimates the penalisation of their 
presence and closes down narratives that might lead to alternative, more inclusive 
interventions (see, for examples, Barker 2016; Koch and Latham 2013). Rather than 
tolerance of the sometimes difficult, through their elimination from urban space policy 
seeks to minimise the "often uncomfortable and troublesome heterogeneous interactions 
of urban life" (Mitchell 1997, 327). 
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In The Precariat, Guy Standing (2011, 14) argues that restrictions on access to rights typically 
associated with citizenship (civil, cultural, economic and political) has created a class of 
people which he terms ‘denizens’, a sub or secondary class within a society. Given they are 
coerced to stay away from public space having often committed no criminal act in these 
spaces, many of the targets of exclusionary mechanisms might reasonably consider 
themselves to have slid into denizenry. This impression is reinforced by evidence of the 
consequences of exclusion. Beckett and Herbert (2010) discovered that the homeless found 
themselves banned from spaces, especially parks, where they typically spent a lot of their 
time, stored possessions or received food and other assistance from charities. As a 
consequence they were forced to move to more peripheral and less familiar areas or cities 
where they felt unsafe sleeping outside. But their sense of being punished extended beyond 
material privations: “Being excluded was often a powerful emotional experience, one that 
confirmed their sense that they were no longer considered citizens, even fully human, by 
other residents of Seattle” (Beckett and Herbert 2010, 34). Gray and Manning’s (2014) 
research with young people living in perceived ASB ‘hotspots’ in an English city uncovered 
similar sentiments. Here, teenagers were especially frustrated that simply being young 
people in public space should precipitate constant surveillance or interference from the 
authorities. They recognised that some teenage behaviour was problematic but resented 
the construction of their presence as a form of transgression. 
 
The concept of ‘revanchism’, Neil Smith’s (1996) characterisation of the retaking of urban 
space from the marginalised, adds weight to the argument that the expulsion of the abject 
is tainted by punitiveness. Smith argued that gentrification, specifically of Manhattan’s 
Lower East Side during the 1980s and 90s, was part of a broader revengeful retaking of the 
city by a middle class made insecure by economic shocks, uncertainty about the future, 
social change and crime (see also Standing 2011; Atkinson 2015). The brunt of the 
revanchist reclamation project was felt by marginalised minorities, including the homeless, 
considered to have expropriated urban space from its rightful owners by their presence and 
behaviour. If not driven out by wave after wave of gentrification, which dispossessed them 
of their homes (see also Slater 2006), marginalised groups were finding up-and-coming 
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neighbourhoods increasingly unliveable due to ever more punitive criminal sanctions, 
targeting previously-tolerated activities, and the much stricter policing of public space.  
 
Much as the expulsion of people from their own neighbourhoods makes the perspective 
seductive, it is important to note that revanchism is a highly contested concept, even in the 
U.S. context. Zukin (2010), for one, observes that the ‘reclaiming’ of public space and 
associated improvements in public safety that took hold in New York during the 1990s was 
popular with many incumbent residents. Even if we accept that a punitive revanchism did – 
and may still – underpin aspects of U.S. policyiv, we must be careful about exporting Smith’s 
critique of Giuliani-era New York to a European policy context (Uitermark and Duyvendak 
2008; May and Cloke 2014). Indeed, DeVerteuil (2012) warns us that narrow interpretations 
of ‘grammars of urban injustice’ can lead to the categorisation of policy responses as mean-
spirited and intentionally punitive when other more benign explanations might be 
applicable. Echoing some of the reservations articulated by Matthews (2005) in his 
dissection of the alleged ‘punitive turn’ in criminal justice, DeVerteuil is critical of scholars’ 
over-eagerness to see punitiveness at the heart of policy solutions. This poses an important 
question: if not punitive and intolerant, how else might we interpret exclusion from public 
space? Three alternative explanations can be identified: risk management, enhancing 
liveability and quality of life, and empowering the authorities to solve problems. These are 
considered in the next section. 
 
Reading exclusion: benign intentions? 
Exclusion seems a simpler and more effective strategy. It forecloses harmful or disruptive behaviour: 
the person is just kept out. There will be no need to induce the person to behave properly while 
present, since he no longer can be there (von Hirsch and Shearing 2000, 78) 
 
While they may appear penal and uncompromising, the innovations in control discussed in 
this article have tended to be presented by their proponents as preventive, risk minimising 
and problem-solving: designed to avert or interdict disorderly or pre-criminal behaviour, 
and underpinned by a “precautionary logic” (Crawford 2009a). The restrictions placed on 
recipients of civil and administrative orders are invariably future orientated, geared to 
discouraging the recurrence of previously witnessed behaviour, eliminating the potential for 
collective disorder from a space before it occurs, or removing, through threat of criminal 
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penalty, those considered at risk of recidivism from spaces where the opportunity to 
reoffend is viewed as high. Ashworth and Zedner (2014) use the helpful term ‘coercive 
prevention’ to characterise the statutory ASB remedies introduced in the UK after 1998:  
coercive because the recipient had no choice but to abide by limits placed on their 
behaviour or use of public space if they were to avoid criminal sanction, yet preventive 
because they were geared to deterring recurrence of ASB. Designers of exclusion-based 
measures elsewhere, even those equated with banishment (Beckett and Herbert 2009; 
2010), can point to the fact that recipients of orders or admonishments restricting access to 
public spaces only come into conflict with the criminal law if they breach the conditions 
imposed on them: coercive prevention for certain but not unavoidable penalisation.  
 
In many respects the penalisation of presence could be read as a modern manifestation of 
the control over public space whose demise Wilson and Kelling (1982) famously lamented 
over 30 years ago. In their influential ‘broken windows’ article, they argued that crime and 
disorder were developmentally linked and a failure to nip disorderly conduct ‘in the bud’ – 
or, in other words, to identify and effectively manage low level risk – could lead to the 
emboldening of proto offenders and an upward spiral in the severity of their criminal 
conduct. Although Wilson and Kelling’s policing-focused solutions to burgeoning disorder 
were never pursued in the UK, the concept of ‘broken windows’ – and the perception that 
action was needed to fix them – was, as Blair (2010) confirms, highly influential over New 
Labour ASB policy (see, for example, Home Office 2003). Indeed, the language of early 
intervention, positioning exclusion as a strategy for closing down the possibility that more 
serious criminality may occur in the future, is a feature of nearly all the control measures 
discussed so far.   
 
A second justification for the penalisation of presence is that those targeted undermine 
quality of life and threaten the liveability of communities (Johnstone and MacLeod 2007; 
Stevens 2009; Beckett and Herbert 2010; Hancock and Mooney 2013). Innes (2014) 
maintains that crime and disorder can be more important for what it signifies to residents 
about the safety and security of their neighbourhood than for its direct impact. These 
‘signal’ crimes and disorders, even when seemingly minor, can alter perception, creating 
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fear and unease. Indeed, Wilson and Kelling (1982) argued that, to most people, incivilities 
and disorderly behaviour are as fear inducing as criminal behaviour, warning that unchecked 
disorder is a key ingredient in neighbourhood decline. In Britain, curbs on ASB allowed the 
Labour government to demonstrate that it was reversing the ‘defining down’ of low level 
deviance witnessed under previous governments (Garland 1996) and responding directly to 
the concerns of communities living with persistent disorderly conduct (Blair 2010; 
Donoghue 2010). In many respects, the 2014 creation of the PSPO, with its explicit focus on 
protecting quality of life, renewed and extended the British government’s commitment to 
this objective. Ordinances in the USA and elsewhere (Beckett and Herbert 2009; Walby and 
Lippert 2012; Zukin 2010), which target people and conduct considered problematic and out 
of place in particular locales, arguably serve a similar function.  
 
One way of enhancing perceptions of neighbourhood safety and liveability is to focus on 
removing those who symbolise disorder. As Stevens (2009: 374) points out, “calls for ‘a 
more liveable environment’ very often mean [...] ‘a more visually ordered environment’”. 
Those groups who, he argues, stand in the way of this goal due to their association with 
nuisance, hazard, conflict or decline, are out of place and ripe for exclusion. While long term 
banishment is evidently one possible response, the use of expulsion can have more modest 
goals. Walby and Lippert (2012) argue that the dispersal of problem populations, which 
offers a short-term remedy to an immediate concern but does not prevent the dispersed 
from returning to that locale in the near future, should not be conflated with other more 
far-reaching measures. Indeed, they reject the notion that all exclusionary practices are 
expressly or equally punitive, arguing that dispersal “has a specific logic that differs from the 
logic of banishment and more punitive spatial regulation” (p1016-17). Their nuanced 
reading is echoed by Barker (2016) who identifies four specific ‘mentalities’ of public space 
regulations, each characterised by techniques and objectives which result in highly varied 
levels of state control over the public realm.  
 
A final argument for benign intentions is that, having identified a need to more effectively 
manage the risky and protect quality of life, it was necessary to empower the police and 
municipal authorities to act in ways which had not previously been lawful. Indeed, Tony 
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Blair (2010) argues that New Labour moved to develop new mechanisms to combat ASB in 
Britain because the authorities were unable to curb it effectively using existing police 
powers and criminal law. Not only did his government create new ordinances, it also 
actively encouraged their deployment. Blair himself praised cities like Manchester, which 
had issued a large number of Asbos year on year, and pressed municipal authorities which 
had been reticent about taking an enforcement-based approach to ASB to follow their 
example (Blair 2004)v. Having decided ASB was a problem, New Labour was keen to 
demonstrate that action was being taken to fix it. The ‘giving the authorities the powers 
they need’ argument was also central to reform of British ASB law in 2014. This was, in large 
part, positioned as a tidying up of old legislation to make it more effective and to fill in some 
important gaps in provision (Home Office 2012).    
 
The creation of administrative codes that enhance the police’s order maintenance role has 
been particularly evident in the U.S. Rather than return to informal ways of enforcing 
community rules, as Wilson and Kelling (1982) had advocated, the development of coercive 
preventive measures has empowered the police to impose as well as enforce exclusions. 
Herbert and Beckett (2009) observe that the patchwork of ordinances implemented in 
Seattle mixed deterrence with greatly enhanced – and gratefully accepted (see Beckett and 
Herbert 2008) – police powers and discretion to manage, often by arrest, problem 
populations whose use of public space would not previously have been a breach of the 
criminal law. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause, which would usually guide U.S. police 
action, became irrelevant when dealing with those subject to spatial bans who strayed into 
a zone from which they had been excluded. 
 
In England and Wales, it was initially the Dispersal Order which gave a boost to police 
power. Crawford (2009b) established that young people would often be encouraged to 
leave Dispersal Zones voluntarily in the full knowledge that failure to do so would trigger 
formal dispersal proceedings. This informal moving on of groups of youths made it appear 
that post-2003 dispersal powers were being used relatively little when in reality the 
designation of a zone empowered the police beyond the letter of the law. Although post-
2014 dispersal powers in England and Wales allow the police more discretion than the old 
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Dispersal Order, the 48 hour exclusion of those considered anti-social from a locality pales in 
comparison to the power of Seattle police officers to exclude a named individual from parks 
across the city for a whole year. In Britain, this level of power has, instead, been vested in 
local government through the creation of the PSPO and draws these authorities further than 
ever before into the policing of perceived public nuisance. 
 
As convincing as the three explanations offered here may be, a problem remains: at the 
heart of exclusion from public space is an acceptance that barring those deemed 
problematic based on an assessment of previous or potential future misconduct is the most 
appropriate action. The possibility that the ‘misuse’ of public space could be ameliorated 
through alterative means less reliant on enforcement is not seriously countenancedvi. 
Furthermore, local and national governments, which might previously have resisted calls for 
punitive action or taken steps to dispel public fears around sources of moral panic, have 
adopted the inverse stance (Waiton 2005). In the cases of ASB in England and Wales, the 
Blair government actively positioned anti-social activity as a primary social problem and 
urgent state suppression as the tonic (Cummings 2005; Waiton 2005; Squires 2006). As 
Crawford (2009a, 3) argues, “in the ASB policy domain, the explicit intention of government 
has been the expansion of regulation: ‘more and more is better’, alongside the 
communication of government as sovereign risk manager”. However, in giving life to the 
concept of ASB, indicating to citizens that they were right to be fearful about it, criminalising 
aspects of it and positioning state enforcement as the remedy to it, Bannister and Kearns 
(2012) argue that recent governments may well be responsible for ingraining concern about 
ASB and those categorised as anti-social in public consciousness (see also Tonry 2004; 
Waiton 2005). Atkinson (2015) does not see this as an accident, arguing that policies 
focusing public ire on the “social detritus of neoliberal systems” (p867) perform a ‘cathartic’ 
function as a pressure release for middle class anxiety and insecurity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Disorderly and anti-social conduct has come sharply into focus in many jurisdictions over the  
last two decades, with the UK and USA leading the way in deploying new mechanisms 
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backed by criminal sanction to curb who and what is permitted in public space. Innovations 
have ranged from outlawing certain types of behaviour or activity, essentially making these 
spaces off limits to certain ‘problem’ groups, to banishing individuals from spaces altogether 
on the grounds that their presence poses an unnecessary risk to security or liveability. As 
Beckett and Herbert (2010:34) contend, “banishment works primarily to expand the criminal 
justice system and to diminish both the life circumstances and the rights-bearing capacity of 
those who are targeted”. Central to such policy is the elimination from public view of the 
visual manifestations of deeper social problems (Rutherford 1997). Success is defined in 
narrow terms: those considered problematic stay away from spaces where they might cause 
trouble or impinge on the quality of life of others through their presence. Delivering more 
fundamental, long-lasting solutions (Barker 2016; Koch and Latham 2013) has been marginal 
to a project which, to date, has paid little attention to the limitations of coercive prevention 
let alone its negative consequences.  
 
Solving such problems through the penalisation of presence would appear an example of 
Young’s (1999) ‘cosmetic fallacy’: the construction of crime and disorder as a blemish on 
society which can be remedied by the application of the appropriate crime prevention 
ointment, rather than a deeper problem of society which has structural causes and requires 
more complex and fundamental change. Once the ‘misuse’ of public space is perceived as 
the consequence of inadequate preventive ‘ointments’ – a control deficit perspective – so 
eliminating the blemish by extending and filling gaps between existing administrative and 
criminal law powers appears an appropriate solution, even when this can mean eroding due 
process, making it almost impossible to challenge exclusion (Herbert and Beckett 2009), or 
acting to “lower the threshold of intervention, formalize previous informal responses, 
intensify forms of intervention and hasten punishment” (Crawford 2009a, 3). From this 
perspective, enforcing civil, pro-social behaviour in an uncompromising way on users of 
public space becomes a legitimate and necessary job for the state to undertake.  
 
What the future holds for those who are not welcome in public space remains unclear. In 
England and Wales, legislative reform has repealed the Asbo, for so long viewed by critics as 
a blunt instrument that enlarged the criminal justice dragnet in a way which unduly 
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ensnared young people (Squires and Stephen 2005), but at the same time it has created the 
PSPO with its sweeping new powers to ban perceived problem behaviours and activities 
from large geographic zones. Although too few PSPOs have yet moved from draft to 
implementation, it appears that the ‘usual suspects’ and young people will once again feel 
the brunt of this new mechanism of control and exclusion. In the U.S., the relentless drift 
towards ever tougher sanctions appears to be stalling (Clear and Frost, 2013) as debate has 
opened up about the purpose and value of criminal justice solutions to social policy 
problems. The DoJ (2015, 15) summed up some of the contradictions arising from punishing 
the poor when it observed, “Criminalizing public sleeping in cities with insufficient housing 
and support for homeless individuals does not improve public safety outcomes or reduce 
the factors that contribute to homelessness”vii. Nonetheless, Clear and Frost (2013) point 
out that the ‘punishment imperative’ has become normalised in the U.S. meaning its 
rollback will be, “less like a lightbulb being turned off and more like the slow cooling of a 
white-hot oven” (p4).  
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i Although passed by the UK parliament, recent legislation on ASB only applies to England 
and Wales, policing and justice matters having been devolved to the Scottish Parliament and 
Northern Ireland Assembly. 
ii See Burney (2005), Millie (2009a; 2009b) and Squires (2008) for discussion of pre-2014 ASB 
policy. 
iii Ministry of Justice (2014) data shows, for example, that of all ASBO recipients between 
2000 and 2013, 36% were youths aged under 18. 
iv See Clear and Frost (2013) on the direction of travel in the U.S. penal policy 
v Liverpool, for example, had a very different attitude to deploying the Asbo (Millie 2009a) 
vi See Koch and Latham (2013) on alternative strategies for resolving conflict over public 
space and Barker (2016) on ‘mediated conviviality’ 
vii It is somewhat ironic that in the same year that the DoJ acknowledged the flaw in anti 
camping bans, municipal authorities in England and Wales started to write them into PSPOs.  
